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Abstract
Despite numerous studies on labor supply, the size of elasticities is rarely com-
parable across countries. In this paper, we suggest the ￿rst large-scale international
comparison of elasticities, while netting out possible di⁄erences due to methods, data
selection and the period of investigation. We rely on comparable data for 17 Euro-
pean countries and the US, a common empirical approach and a complete simulation
of tax-bene￿t policies a⁄ecting household budgets. We ￿nd that wage-elasticities
are small and vary less across countries than previously thought, e.g., between :2
and :6 for married women. Results are robust to several modeling assumptions. We
show that di⁄erences in tax-bene￿t systems or demographic compositions explain
little of the cross-country variation, leaving room for other interpretations, notably
in terms of heterogeneous work preferences. We derive important implications for
research on optimal taxation.
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The study of labor supply behavior continues to play an important role in policy analysis
and economic research. In particular, the size of labor supply elasticities is a key com-
ponent when evaluating tax-bene￿t policy reforms and their e⁄ect on tax revenue and
employment. It may also crucially a⁄ect the conclusions of optimal tax applications (e.g.,
Saez, 2001), the speci￿cation of empirical real business cycle models (e.g., Kimmel and
Kniesner, 1998, or Kydland, 1995) or the results of computable general equilibrium mod-
els (e.g., Bovenberg et al., 2000, or Ballard et al., 1985). Yet there is a great variation in
the magnitude of elasticities found in the literature, and little agreement among econo-
mists on the size of elasticity that should be used in economic policy analyses (Fuchs et
al., 1998). Di⁄erences across countries may be crucial on many accounts. For instance,
whether an incentive policy like the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) could work
in continental Europe depends fundamentally on local labor supply behavior. More gen-
erally, di⁄erences across countries may play a key role when comparing the optimality of
welfare regimes (see Immervoll et al., 2007) or when questioning the implications of an
EU-wide tax system or the di⁄erence in mean work hours between Europe and the US
(Prescott, 2004).
Several excellent surveys exist that report evidence on elasticities for di⁄erent coun-
tries and di⁄erent periods. Those written in the 1980s mainly focus on estimations using
the continuous labor supply model of Hausman (1981) and provide evidence essentially for
individuals in couples (Hausman, 1985, Pencavel, 1986, for married men, Killingsworth
and Heckman, 1986, for married women). More recent surveys incorporate other methods
and point to a relative consensus on some key ￿ndings (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999,
and Meghir and Phillips, 2008).1 Yet evidence is scattered and a lot of heterogeneity
in estimated elasticities is observed. For instance, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report
uncompensated wage elasticities ranging from ￿0:01 to 2:03 for married women. Admit-
tedly, much of the variation in labor supply estimates across studies is due to di⁄erent
choices made by the analysts, including the type of data used (e.g., tax register data
versus interview-based surveys), the data selection (e.g., focusing on households with or
without children), the empirical approach (e.g., natural experiments; continuous or dis-
crete structural models; models accounting or not for taxes, transfers and work costs, etc.,
1In brief, this consensus establishes that income elasticities are generally small and negative; own wage
elasticities are usually large for married women, smaller and sometimes negative for men; wage elasticities
are mostly driven by changes at the participation margin (Heckman, 1993). Note that elasticities found in
the macroeconomic literature, often obtained by calibration of general equilibrium models (e.g., Prescott,
2004), are generally much larger than in microeconomic studies. Several reasons have been suggested,
including di⁄erent timing of adjustments (Chetty et al., 2009).
1see the discussions in Evers et al., 2008). The period of observation is also important,
since elasticities within a country can change dramatically over time (see Heim, 2007,
for the US). Beyond these di⁄erences in the way we measure elasticities, the question is
whether genuine di⁄erences exist between countries, which could be explained by di⁄er-
ent demographic compositions, tax-bene￿t systems, labor market conditions and cultural
backgrounds.
The present paper aims to shed some light on this question. We ￿rst review existing
evidence for Europe and the US, then undertake the task of reassessing wage and in-
come elasticities of labor supply in a comparable way for a large number of countries. In
methodological terms, the ideal situation would be to use a generally agreed-upon stan-
dard estimation approach that also allows comparable measures across countries. Recent
practice has focused on natural experiments, and notably changes in tax-bene￿t regula-
tions, that can be used to assess labor supply responsiveness. Obviously, no reform can
be found that would allow labor supply responses across countries to be compared. Even
if, say, a European-wide tax reform existed, we could not tell whether di⁄erent responses
across EU states were due to di⁄erent behavior or, for instance, to the interaction of the
policy change with di⁄erent tax-bene￿t systems. In this situation, the only way to com-
pare countries consistently is to rely on a common structural model that allows predicting
elasticities in a uniform fashion. We opt for a ￿ exible discrete-choice model, as used in
well-known contributions for Europe (van Soest, 1995, Blundell et al., 2000) or the US
(Hoynes, 1996, Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). Importantly, this model can account for the
comprehensive e⁄ect of tax-bene￿t policies on household budgets. First, this might allow
explaining some of the international di⁄erences in labor supply elasticities. Second, and
more importantly, nonlinearities and discontinuities from tax-bene￿t rules improve the
identi￿cation of the model (together with demographic heterogeneity and some spatial
and time variation in net wages). Our estimations are conducted on 25 representative
micro-datasets covering 17 European countries and the US, with two years of data for
some countries. Datasets cover a relatively narrow period, which facilitates cross-country
comparison. We provide detailed estimates for di⁄erent demographic and income groups,
both at the intensive margin (worked hours) and extensive margin (participation).
The paper is easily positioned in the literature. To our knowledge, only Evers et
al. (2008) gather evidence for a large set of countries, including several EU member states.
While their meta-analysis controls for di⁄erences in countries, methods and other aspects,
there may not be enough variations across studies ￿and not enough studies per country ￿
to isolate genuine international di⁄erences from other factors. More speci￿c studies have
also been suggested where a common labor supply estimation strategy is used to study the
e⁄ect of a uniform reform in di⁄erent European countries, e.g., a basic-income ￿ at-tax
2reform for Italy, Norway and Sweden in Aaberge et al. (2000) or di⁄erent income-tax
principles for Denmark, Germany, Ireland and the UK in Smith et al. (2003). The special
issue of the Journal of Human Resources published in 1990 has also provided evidence
from di⁄erent countries using the Hausman approach (see the introduction of Mo¢ tt,
1990). We are not aware, however, of a systematic attempt to estimate and compare
labor supply responsiveness over a large number of countries using a relatively harmonized
approach that nets out possible di⁄erences due to data, periods and methods. In fact,
such a comprehensive characterization was not possible in the past. Indeed, the present
study bene￿ts from a unique set of comparable data and from tax-bene￿t calculators now
made available for numerous European countries (EUROMOD) and the US (TAXSIM).
To this we add a considerable computational e⁄ort to estimate labor supply models for all
countries and for various speci￿cations. In particular, we check whether elasticities vary
with the functional form (the ￿ exibility of the utility function) and with the hour choice set
(from a basic 4-choice model to a much narrower discretization bringing the model close
to a continuous one). The complete analysis is based on nine di⁄erent speci￿cations, three
demographic groups (couples, single women and men) and 25 di⁄erent countries￿periods,
hence a total of 625 maximum likelihood (ML) estimations. We show that estimates are
relatively stable across model speci￿cations, giving con￿dence in the results and conveying
that the size of elasticities is not driven by methodological choices.
Results are presented as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing methods and the
available evidence regarding elasticities in Europe and the US. In Section 3, we describe
the empirical approach while the main results are reported and discussed in Section 4.
We show that cross-country di⁄erences in labor supply elasticities exist but are relatively
small. When accounting for nonlinear taxation, ￿xed costs of work and joint labor supply
in couples, we also ￿nd that wage elasticities of hour and participation are overall fairly
modest. In particular, estimates for married women stand in a narrow range between :2
and :6, with signi￿cantly larger elasticities obtained for countries where female participa-
tion is lower (Greece, Spain, Ireland). Estimates for married men are closer to zero and
show little variation. A larger variance is found for single women, with estimates between
:1 and :6, which is due to the prevalence of single mothers in some countries. More vari-
ation exist when considering di⁄erent income groups, with particularly large elasticities
(sometimes larger than 1) among low-wage single individuals in some countries. This
result, i.e., higher responsiveness in the low part of the income distribution, has crucial
implication for welfare analysis (see Eissa et al., 2008). In Section 5, we focus on married
women to analyze international di⁄erences. We investigate the role of tax-bene￿t systems,
country-speci￿c demographic composition (age, education and childbearing patterns) and
selection into marriage as possible explanatory factors of international variation in the
3size of elasticities. These factors explain in fact very little, suggesting that cross-country
variation may be due to heterogeneity in individual preferences towards work and, addi-
tionally, in social preferences which lead to contrasted childcare institutions. Interestingly,
this result is similar to the time change in elasticities for the US (Heim, 2007 interprets
the decline in elasticities over time as re￿ ecting cross-cohort changes in preferences toward
work). Section 6 concludes and derives implications for optimal taxation. Importantly,
(i) the levels of elasticities, on average and across income groups, (ii) the correlation with
participation rates and (iii) the gender di⁄erences in elasticities reported in the present
study can signi￿cantly enrich the applications of the optimal tax literature along several
dimensions, including the traditional equity-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄, the issue of whether ￿-
nancial support should be directed to workless poor or to working poor (Immervoll et al.,
2007, Blundell et al., 2008) and the issue of joint versus individual taxation in couples
(Immervoll et al., 2011).
2 Methods and Existing Evidence
The principal object of examination in this study is the size of wage and income elastic-
ities, which are standard representations of labor supply responsiveness and particularly
convenient when conducting international comparisons. To start with, we present a brief
account of the available techniques to estimate labor supply, then discuss some of the
evidence, reported for European couples in Tables 1 and 2, for European single individu-
als in Table 3 and for the US in Table 4.2 This survey essentially distinguishes between
estimates based on the Hausman approach, discrete-choice models and other methods.
We put a certain emphasis on the studies based on discrete models with taxation, as this
is the method we use and because of the skyrocketing number of such studies to analyze
policies in the recent years. Yet we do not pretend to be exhaustive, simply to give a
sense of the range of elasticities obtained in the literature for Europe and the US.3 Notice,
however, that this survey substantially completes previous reviews, notably Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2008), who concentrate mainly on evidence
from the Hausman model, for the 1980s and 1990s and for Anglo-Saxon countries.
Arguably, the Hausman approach was most often restricted to the case of piecewise
linear and convex budget sets, hence a partial representation of the e⁄ect of tax-bene￿t
policies on household budget constraints. MaCurdy et al. (1990) have also emphasized
2To keep our reference list reasonably short, Tables 1-3 refer, for most of the cited studies, to four
surveys which gather all the exact references.
3Note also that we do not cover dynamic models or other margins than hour/participation (migration,
tax evasion, work e⁄ort, etc.). Evidence on the elasticities of taxable income, as obtained from natural
experiments, is surveyed in Meghir and Phillips (2008).
4that the combination of restrictive functional forms (linear labor supply) and estimation
methods that impose theoretical consistency of the labor supply model everywhere in the
sample (global satisfaction of Slutsky conditions) leads to biased estimates and possibly
an overstatement of work incentives (see Heim and Meyer, 2003). In contrast, the discrete-
choice approach requires the explicit parameterization of consumption-leisure preferences
as it assumes that labor supply decisions can be reduced to choosing among a discrete set
of possibilities (e.g., inactivity, part-time and full-time). Thus, there is no need to restrict
preferences and, in particular, to impose their convexity. In practice, speci￿c utility
functions are used, and we shall check whether the degree of ￿ exibility makes a di⁄erence.
The discrete approach also solves several other problems encountered with the Hausman
method, which explains its relative success over the years. Firstly, discrete models directly
account for both participation and working-time decisions (non-participation is just one of
the discrete options). This is important, as most of labor supply adjustments occur along
this margin (Heckman, 1993, Eissa and Hoynes, 1996). Secondly, consumption (disposable
income) needs to be assessed only at certain points of the budget curve so that complex
tax-bene￿t systems, that generate nonlinear budget constraints and nonconvex budget
sets, can easily be dealt with. However, in order to maintain computational feasibility,
the number of choices is typically limited to commonly agreed durations of work. We
shall check whether moving closer to the continuous case a⁄ects the estimated elasticities
(see also Heim, 2009, for a model combining continuous and discrete dimensions). A
narrower discretization may also help to capture peaks which are not necessarily identical
across countries (i.e., the overtime option in the US) in a cross-country analysis like ours.
Thirdly, work costs, which also create nonconvexities, and joint decisions in couples are
dealt with in a relatively straightforward way in the discrete approach.4
A crucial aspect is the identi￿cation of behavioral parameters. Estimates obtained
with the Hausman approach are often contaminated by measurement errors (the division
bias) and by assuming wage exogeneity. That is, unobserved characteristics (e.g., being
a hard-working person) in￿ uence both wages and work preferences so that estimates
obtained from cross-sectional wage variation across individuals are potentially biased.
Arguably, natural experiments based on tax reforms do a better job as they directly
4Discrete models do not solve all the problems, however. One of the remaining issues is the fact
that some of the choices may not be available to some people because of institutional constraints or
individual/job characteristics. Due to a lack of information, and the large number of countries in our
study, we do not deal with this constraint in an elaborated way ￿which may limit the comparability of our
results ￿but simply account for it through speci￿c parameters as explained below. Several studies suggest
interesting ways to circumvent the problem, either by allowing the choice set to vary with individual
characteristics (Aaberge et al., 1995) or by modeling the degree of captivity, possibly due to institutional
constraints, to each observed hours alternative (Duncan and Harris, 2002). Several authors also use
desired hours rather than observed hours (e.g., van Soest and Das, 2001).
5identify responses to exogenous variations in net wages, provided that control groups are
well de￿ned or that discontinuities in RD estimations are not due to other factors than the
policy under study. The recent literature has exploited tax-bene￿t reforms of the 1980s
and 1990s in the US, and to some extent in the UK, to assess labor supply responsiveness
(e.g., US income tax reforms, AFDC/TANF reforms, extension of the EITC or the UK
tax credit). Many of these important studies report the e⁄ects of reforms ￿ see the
survey of Holz and Scholz (2003) for the US ￿but not comparable elasticity measures,
so they were not included in our survey (e.g., Bingley and Walker, 1997, Hoynes, 1996,
Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Also, most of these reforms concerned families with children
so that very few estimates are available for childless single individuals, as we can see
in Table 4 for the US. Moreover, the lack of important reforms or policy discontinuity
in Europe, or the under-use of them by European researcher, is re￿ ected in Tables 1-
3 where most studies are based on the estimation of structural models with taxation
(a notable exception is the UK). A few studies use grouped data estimations of the
correlation between hours/participation and wages over a long period to address the
problem of measurement error in hourly wages (e.g., Devereux, 2004). Discrete models
hold an intermediary position between natural experiments and the Hausman approach.
Wage endogeneity problem may exist, yet these models account for nonlinear taxation
in household budgets, which may create exogenous variation in net wages across regions,
periods of time and demographic groups, and hence improve model identi￿cation. We
discuss this point in detail in the next section.
From Tables 1 and 2, a ￿rst observation is that early evidence using the Hausman
technique points to relatively large own-wage elasticities for married women, sometimes
close to 1, or even larger, for instance in early studies for France, Germany, Italy or
the UK. In contrast, recent evidence based on discrete-choice models shows more modest
elasticities for this group, in a range between :1 and :5, with some exceptions. Several
explanations provided in the literature pertain to the arguments made above, including the
MaCurdy critique, the fact that ￿xed costs are ignored or simply that these elasticities
were collected mainly in the 80s, when female participation was still relatively low in
many countries.5 In Table 4, we observe a similar pattern for the US, with very large
estimates in early studies, including Hausman (1981), and more reasonable elasticities in
the recent studies (hour elasticities ranging between :2 and :4). It should be noted that
estimates are very similar whether they stem from reduced-form estimations (Devereux,
2004), natural experiments (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004) or structural models (Heim, 2009).
As expected, estimates for married men are much smaller and often not signi￿cant or even
5More recent evidence coincides with rising participation rates and a mechanical decline in female
elasticity, as established for the US in Blau and Kahn (2005) and Heim (2007).
6negative. There are few exceptions, with more substantial male elasticities in Ireland and
for some of the German studies. Evidence for childless single individuals is very limited
and point to very small elasticities. It is possible that participation responses might be
more signi￿cant for low-skilled workers (see suggestive evidence in Eissa and Liebman,
1996, and the discussion in section 4). More numerous studies are available concerning
single mothers. This group has received much attention because of higher risk of poverty
and the fact that these women are usually more responsive to ￿nancial incentives. This is
con￿rmed in Table 3, where relatively large elasticities are shown, especially for Sweden,
the UK and the US.
It is noticeable that studies for a given country sometimes report very di⁄erent mag-
nitudes, even when the same method is used. For instance for the US, married women￿ s
wage elasticity obtained with the Hausman approach vary from :28 (Triest) to :97 (Haus-
man), depending on the constraints put on the model (see the discussion in Heim and
Meyer, 2003). For France, estimates for married women are also very high with the basic
Hausman model, but almost zero when introducing ￿xed costs (in this case, the model
account only for variations in hours, cf., Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990). Estimates
obtained with discrete-choice models are somewhat more comparable from one study to
the next. Yet there are still di⁄erences, which are more likely driven by selection criteria
(for France, high elasticities are found for families with children in ChonØ et al., 2003) and
the type of data (administrative data in Laroque and SalaniØ, 2002, household surveys
in Bargain and Orsini, 2006). Speci￿cations and modeling choices may however play a
role in the discrete approach as well, for instance regarding the treatment of couples (e.g.,
male-chauvinistic model in Bargain and Orsini, 2006, joint decisions in Bargain et al.,
2009). It is rare to ￿nd several studies focusing on the same country and using a sim-
ilar empirical approach, which would o⁄er an interesting con￿dence interval (this exists
for Germany, with fairly consistent results for married women, yet relatively contrasted
estimates for single women across studies).
What can be learned from international comparisons at this stage? Focusing on mar-
ried women, for whom we have the largest number of studies, we can observe that larger
elasticities prevail in countries where women￿ s participation is low. This is particularly
true for Ireland (see Callan et al., 2009) and Italy (see Aaberge et al., 2002). In contrast,
women￿ s participation is high in Nordic countries and elasticities tend to be fairly small
(an exception is Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz, 1990, for Sweden, but the authors
examine data from the 1980s, while more recent evidence by Flood et al., 2004, con￿rm
small hour elasticities for this country). Comparing Italy and Norway/Sweden, Aaberge et
al. (2000) show that lower participation rates among married women in Southern Europe
leads to a larger potential for reforms that increase ￿nancial incentives to work. Apart
from these extreme cases, di⁄erences across countries may not be very large, as suggested
7by Evers et al. (2008). However, comparisons are muddled by all the methodological dif-
ferences highlighted above and are incomplete (estimates are missing for several countries
and demographic groups). The remainder of this study aims to ￿ll some of this gap by
estimating labor supply elasticities in a comparable fashion in 17 European countries and
the US and for all demographic groups.
3 A Common Empirical Approach
3.1 Model and Identi￿cation
Model and Speci￿cation. We essentially follow van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996) and
Blundell et al. (2000) and refer to these studies for more technical details. In our baseline,
we specify consumption-leisure preferences using a quadratic utility function, that is, the
deterministic utility of a couple i at each discrete choice j = 1;:::;J can be written as:






















with household consumption Cij and spouses￿worked hours H
f
ij and Hm
ij . The J choices
of a couple correspond to all combinations of the spouses￿discrete hours. Coe¢ cients
on consumption and work hours, namely ￿ci, ￿hfi and ￿hmi, are household-speci￿c and
vary linearly with several taste-shifters (polynomial form of age, presence of children or
dependent elders and region). The term ￿ci also incorporates unobserved heterogeneity for
the model to allow random taste variation and unrestricted substitution patterns between
alternatives. The ￿t is improved by the introduction of ￿xed costs of work as in Callan
et al. (2009) or Blundell et al. (2000). Fixed costs explain the fact that there are very
few observations with a small positive number of worked hours. These costs, denoted Fij
and non-zero for positive hour choices, also depend on observed characteristics and are
expressed here in utility metric since they may correspond to actual costs (childcare) or
psychological costs (leaving the children with strangers). They may also capture demand-
side constraints and the availability of jobs (see Aaberge et al., 1995). Note that ￿xed costs
are only parametrically identi￿ed, i.e., a very ￿ exible utility function could pick up the
gap in the distribution at few hours (see van Soest et al., 2002). This militates in favor
of relaxing usual regularity conditions on leisure/labor supply (see the methodological
discussion in section 2 and Heim and Meyer, 2003). More generally, as we specify utility
directly and not a labor supply function, tangency conditions are not required, and hence
we simply check quasi-concavity of the utility function a posteriori. The only restriction
to our model is the imposition of increasing monotonicity in consumption, which seems
a minimum requirement for meaningful interpretation and policy analysis. Hence, the
8"structural" aspect of the model is not very constraining, and the restrictions due to the
functional form can also be relaxed (in the next section, we check the robustness of our
results to alternative speci￿cations). For each labor supply choice j, disposable income
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of female earnings, male earnings and non-labor income yi. The tax-bene￿t function




i for each household i are predicted using calculated wage rates
from data information on workers and Heckman-corrected wage estimations. Because the
model is nonlinear, the wage-rate prediction errors can be taken explicitly into account
for a consistent estimation. The deterministic utility is completed by i.i.d. error terms
￿ij for each choice assumed to represent possible observational errors, optimization errors
or transitory situations. Under the assumption that error terms follow an extreme value
type I (EV-I) distribution, the (conditional) probability for each household of choosing a
given alternative has an explicit analytical solution (a logistic function of deterministic
utilities at all choices). The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the
disturbance terms (unobserved heterogeneity and the wage error term) in the likelihood.
In practice, this is done by averaging the conditional probability over a large number of
draws, and the simulated likelihood function can be maximized to obtain all estimated
parameters (Train, 2003).6 The model for single individuals (with or without children) is
the same as above with only one hour term (J is simply the number of discrete options
for this person).
Identi￿cation. First of all, we predict wages for all observations, as explained above, in
order to reduce some of the bias due to measurement errors on wages stemming from the
division bias. In addition, accounting fully for tax-bene￿t policies helps to create some
variation in net wage between people with the same gross wage. That is, individuals face
di⁄erent e⁄ective tax schedules, i.e., di⁄erent actual marginal tax rates or bene￿t with-
drawal rates, because of their di⁄erent circumstances (di⁄erent marital status, age, family
compositions, home-ownership status, disability status) or di⁄erent levels of nonlabor in-
come. Using nonlinearities and discontinuities generated by the tax-bene￿t system in this
6We also insist on the fact that the two-stage approach used here is common practice (see Creedy
and Kalb, 2005). Simultaneous estimations of wages and labor supply seem the ideal approach, yet
this approach is rarely adopted (among exceptions, see Laroque and SalaniØ, 2001). The reason is that
tax-bene￿t simulations must be run at each iteration of the ML estimation, which requires that they are
available in the same computer language (this is not the case with EUROMOD) and which also takes
more time (which would not be feasible given the large number of countries we are dealing with).
9way is a frequent identi￿cation strategy in the empirical literature based on static discrete
models and cross-sectional data (see van Soest, 2005, Blundell et al. 2000). Furthermore,
we bene￿t here from some time and spatial variation that can produce additional exoge-
nous variations in net wages. For seven countries, we dispose of two years of data. The
three-year interval between the two corresponding tax-bene￿t systems, 1998 and 2001,
gives us some guarantee that enough exogenous changes in tax-bene￿t policies occurred
over time. Several important reforms indeed took place (e.g., the Working Family Tax
Credit reform in the UK, reductions in social security contributions in Belgium and Ger-
many, new tax credit and tax reforms, tax reforms in France, Germany, Ireland, etc.,
see Orsini, 2006). Notice that consecutive years would provide less exogenous variation
but would also make the assumption of constant preferences over time less restrictive.
This trade-o⁄ is interesting and rarely discussed in the literature. In the next section,
we examine the implications of conducting estimations either on pooled years or on each
year of data separately.
For most countries, we also have regional variation in tax-bene￿t rules and, hence, in
net wages. This source of identi￿cation has been extensively used in the US (variations
across states in the income tax code, in bene￿ts rules and the EITC are used in labor
supply studies, e.g., Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, Hoynes, 1996, or Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001). For EU member states, housing bene￿ts vary in almost all countries at the munici-
pality or county level, taking into account local di⁄erences in housing costs (exceptions are
Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain). In Estonia, Hungary and Poland, local governments
provide di⁄erent supplements to almost all bene￿ts, including child bene￿ts/allowances
and social assistance. Regional variation in the latter also exists in Denmark, Germany,
Italy and Spain. Finally, taxation often varies locally.7 The tax-bene￿t simulators at use
and demographic information in our datasets allow us to account for all these di⁄erences
across households in our sample. Ideally, of course, one would like to gather many years of
data for each country to allow for more exogenous variations in net wages (as in Blundell
et al., 1998). This is certainly an enormous task when trying to compare many countries
and when accounting for complete tax-bene￿t systems, as we do here. Also, we must
acknowledge that the sources of identi￿cation are partly di⁄erent across countries, which
7County and municipality ￿ at taxes in Nordic countries can vary substantially (ex: 22:8 ￿ 27:8% in
Denmark; 16:5 ￿ 21% in Finland; 29 ￿ 36% in Sweden). Regional variations in church tax rates are
signi￿cant in Finland and Germany. Note that the mere choice of paying church tax is also a relatively
exogenous variation across individuals in all countries where it exists. Social insurance contributions can
vary by region (e.g., in Germany). Other regional variation exists and concerns tax rates (the Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain via imputed rents), tax credits (Belgium), tax deductions (Italy) and council
taxes (the UK). Note that for the EU, information on tax-bene￿t rules for each country is available at:
www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod (together with modeling choices and validation of EUROMOD).
For the US, tax-bene￿t rules (and TAXSIM) are presented in detail at www.nber.org/~taxsim/.
10limits the comparability of our results. This issue is obviously not speci￿c to our study.
In fact, the degree to which we can compare elasticities across studies, most often based
on di⁄erent identifying assumptions, could be questioned all the same. We believe that
the present approach constitutes a reasonable trade-o⁄ between comparability attempt
and a reasonable identi￿cation strategy on cross-sectional data.
Elasticities. In the present nonlinear model, labor supply elasticities cannot be derived
analytically but can be calculated by numerical simulations using the estimated model.
For wage (income) elasticities, we simply predict the change in average work hours and
in participation rates following a marginal uniform increase in wage rates (non-labor
income). We have checked that results are similar when wage elasticities are calculated
by simulating either a 1% or a 10% increase in gross wages (unearned incomes). For
couples, cross-wage elasticities are obtained by simulating changes in female hours when
male wage rates are increased, and vice versa. For predictions of labor supply e⁄ects,
baseline estimates rely on the frequency approach, which consists simply of averaging
the probability of each discrete choice over all households before and after a change in
wage rates or unearned income. In the robustness section, we also report results using
the calibration method (Creedy and Kalb, 2005). This approach, consistent with the
probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level, consists of repeatedly drawing a
set of J + 1 random terms for each household from an EV-I distribution (together with
terms for unobserved heterogeneity), which generate a perfect match between predicted
and observed choices. The same draws are kept when predicting labor supply responses
to an increase in wages or non-labor income. Averaging individual responses over a large
number of draws provides robust transition matrices.
3.2 Data, Selection and Tax-Bene￿t Simulations
Data and Selection. We focus on the US, 14 members of the EU prior to May 1, 2004
(the so-called EU-15 except Luxembourg) and three new member states (NMS), namely
Estonia, Hungary and Poland. For each country, we draw from standard household sur-
veys the information about incomes and demographics that can be used for detailed
tax-bene￿t simulations and labor supply estimations (see data source in the third row
of Table 5). For the EU-15, the datasets at use have been assembled within the frame-
work of the EUROMOD project (see Sutherland, 2007) and combined with tax-bene￿t
simulations for years 1998, 2001 or both. For the NMS, data were collected for the year
2005, and policies simulated for that year, in a more recent development of the EURO-
MOD project. For the US, we use the 2006 (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
IPUMS) Current Population Survey (CPS), which contains information for the year 2005
11as well. Datasets have been harmonized in the sense that similar income concepts are
used together with comparable variable de￿nitions. For each country, we extract three
samples (couples, single men and women) for the purpose of labor supply estimations.
We only keep households where adults are aged between 18 and 59, available for the labor
market (not disabled, retired or in education) and we exclude self-employed, farmers and
"extreme" situations, including very large families and those who report implausibly high
levels of working hours.
Simulations. For each discrete choice j and each household i, disposable income Cij is
obtained by adding bene￿ts and withdrawing taxes and social contributions to household
gross income. These tax-bene￿t calculations, represented by function d() in expression
(2), are performed using information on income and socio-demographics together with
tax-bene￿t simulators. For Europe we use EUROMOD, a calculator designed to simulate
the redistributive systems of the EU-15 countries and of some of the NMS. An introduction
to EUROMOD, a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU and robustness
checks are provided by Sutherland (2007). EUROMOD has been used in several empirical
studies, notably in the comparison of European welfare regimes by Immervoll et al. (2007,
2011). For the US, tax-bene￿t calculations are conducted using TAXSIM (version v9),
the NBER calculator presented in Feenberg and Coutts (1993), augmented by simulations
of social transfers. This calculator is used in combination with CPS data in several
applications (e.g, Eissa et al., 2008).8 We assume full bene￿t take-up and tax compliance.
More re￿ned estimations accounting for the stigma of welfare program participation would
require precise data information on actual receipt of bene￿ts, which is not always available
or reliable in interview-based surveys (see Blundell et al., 2000).
Statistics. Descriptive statistics of the selected samples are presented in Table 5. For
married women, mean worked hours show considerable variation across countries. This
is essentially due to lower labor market participation in Southern countries (with the
noticeable exception of Portugal), Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and Poland.
The correlation between mean hours and participation rates is :92. There is nonetheless
some variation in work hours among participants, with shorter work duration in Austria,
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. The participation of single women is lower
in Ireland and the UK due to the larger frequency of single mothers (we can see that the
average number of children among single women is the highest in these two countries
8Note that we make use of those policy years available in EUROMOD at the time of writing (1998,
2001 or 2005, as indicated above). For comparison, we use TAXSIM simulations for the year 2005.
Hopefully, future developments of the EUROMOD project will allow extending our results to more recent
data (and more countries).
12and Poland). There is much less variation for men, the main notable fact being lower
participation rate for single compared to married men. The variation in wage rates and
demographic composition across countries is also noteworthy. In particular for married
women, participation rates are correlated with wage rates (corr = :36) and the number of
children (￿:61). Attached to these patterns, there may be interesting di⁄erences across
countries in the responsiveness of labor supply to wages and income. We turn to this
central issue in the next sections. In Table 6, we take a closer look at the distribution of
actual worked hours. For men, this shows the strong concentration of work hours around
full time (35 ￿ 44 hours per week) and non-participation. There is more variations for
women, in particular with the availability of part-time work in some countries (another
peak at 15-24 hours can be seen in Belgium and the Netherlands, or at 25-34 hours in
France where some ￿rms o⁄er a 3/4 of a full-time contract). The US is characterized by a
relatively concentrated distribution (around full-time and inactivity) and a relatively high
rate of overtime. To accommodate with the particular hour distribution of each country,
while maintaining a comparable framework, we suggest a baseline estimation using a 7-
point discretization, i.e., J = 7 for singles and J = 7 ￿ 7 for couples, with choices from
0 to 60 hours/week (step of 10 hours). We check below the sensitivity of our results to
alternative choice sets.
4 Results
4.1 Labor Supply Estimations
Main Results. Estimated parameters are broadly in line with usual ￿ndings and we
comment them very brie￿ y.9 As expected, the presence of children signi￿cantly decreases
the propensity to work for women (both women in couples and single mothers) in most
countries. Taste shifters related to age are often signi￿cant for women in couples but not
systematically for other demographic groups. The constant of the cost of work is always
signi￿cantly positive for all groups. The presence of young children impact most often
positively and signi￿cantly on the work cost of women. For single men and women, higher
education leads to lower costs which can be interpreted as demand-side constraints in the
form of lower search costs (see van Soest and Das, 2001).
Fit. Pseudo-R2 convey that the ￿t is reasonably good: :31 on average for couples (:28
for singles), from :23 for the UK to :45 for Poland (from :16 in Sweden to :40 in Greece
for single females and :14 in Sweden to :40 in Belgium for single men). Since pseudo-R2
9Due to a lack of space, we do not report estimates. Detailed tables with estimates, log-likelihood and
pseudo R2 are available from the authors, separately for couples, single women and single men.
13cannot be interpreted as standard R2, a more useful measure of the ￿t consists of the
comparison between observed and predicted hours. In Table 7, we ￿rst notice that mean
hours compare well, as the discrepancy of mean predicted hours is less than 1% in most
of the cases. There are some exceptions, with larger di⁄erences especially for women in
Portugal, Greece and Spain. For the two latter countries, we report the distribution of
observed and predicted frequencies for each choice (here we use 4x4 choices rather than the
7x7 baseline, to make it more readable). We can see that the option 11 (both spouses work
40 hours/week) is slightly underestimated while the choice 3 (she does not not work, he
works full-time) is overpredicted. Yet, even for these countries, the overall distributions
of observed and predicted hours compare well. We have checked for all countries that
satisfying comparisons at the mean do not hide wrong hour distributions. We report
only two additional graphs for an illustration of the case where mean hours are correctly
predicted (France and the Netherlands), con￿rming that this corresponds to a situation
where distributions also compare very well. Finally, we have estimated the baseline model
on a random half of the sample for each country and used it to predict hours for the other
half. Fit measures on the holdout sample show good results and convey that the ￿ exible
model at use does not over￿t the data in a way that would reduce external validity.
4.2 Elasticities
General Comments. Baseline labor supply elasticities are summarized in Tables 8
and 9 for couples and Tables 10 and 11 for single women and single men respectively.
We report own-wage hour elasticities, overall and for quintiles of disposable income, the
hour elasticity for the sub-group of participants (the pure intensive margin) and the
participation elasticity (the extensive margin), followed by cross-wage hour elasticities and
income elasticities. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained by repeated random draws
of the model parameters from their estimated distributions and by recalculating elasticities
for each draw. This is computationally demanding and we perform these bootstraps only
for the main elasticity results. It transpires that estimates are relatively precise, slightly
more for couples than for single individuals.10 Results are broadly in line with stylized
facts in this literature. Firstly, most of the response to wage changes is due to changes in
participation (the extensive margin). The pure intensive elasticities are extremely small
for all countries and all demographic groups, for example, lower than :08 for married
women in all countries (except the Netherlands). They are sometimes negative for men in
10This may be due to the fact that there is less variation in labor market behavior among singles (with
the exception of lone parents when compared to childless single individuals). Also, the model for couples
generally ￿ts the data better because the relatively high level of voluntary inactivity among married
women conforms well with the supply-side behavioral assumptions.
14couples (Italy and the UK) and for singles (for instance, single men in Belgium, Ireland
and Portugal). Reassuringly, the total (own-wage) hour elasticity is close to the sum of
the pure intensive elasticity and the participation elasticity in most of the cases. Secondly,
own-wage elasticities are the largest for married women and the smallest for married men,
as expected. For couples, cross-wage elasticities are negative and smaller than own-wage
elasticities, yet nonetheless sizeable for some countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany and
Ireland), which is not an usual result (see, e.g., Callan et al., 2009, or Aaberge et al., 2000).
As often in the literature, income elasticities are negative and very small in absolute value.
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report that variation between studies regarding the income
elasticity appears to be greater than the corresponding variation with respect to the
wage elasticity. We do not con￿rm much variation as far as "controlled" cross-country
comparisons are concerned. In the following, we focus speci￿cally on own-wage elasticities
to link our results to the existing literature.
Reconciliation with Past Results. The survey in section 2 conveyed the idea that
elasticities are relatively modest when estimated using unconstrained, discrete-choice
models (as compared to ￿rst generation Hausman models). Our results con￿rm this
trend in a more de￿nitive manner, given the large number of countries under investiga-
tion and the common framework at use. Concerning married women, our estimates are
very close to, or not statistically di⁄erent from, past ￿ndings for Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, Germany, Sweden and the UK.11 Our estimates are however smaller or close to the
lower bound of past con￿dence intervals for Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, which is
partly explained by the use of older data in the cited studies based on discrete models
(e.g., papers by van Soest and coauthors cited in Table 2) or by a di⁄erent, more general
approach where the choice set is extended to hour-wage bundles (see papers by Aaberge,
Colombino and coauthors in Table 2). For France, elasticities for married women are
smaller than in other studies, which can be attributed to di⁄erent methods, data and
selection as explained above. For Spain, our estimates are relatively large compared to
previous evidence, yet the rare studies based on discrete models do not report con￿dence
intervals. Our estimates for the US are very small and compare well to the most recent
results (Heim, 2009). US studies which report larger elasticities rely on older data, while
it has been shown that elasticities have dramatically decreased over time (Heim, 2007).
For other countries, evidence based on discrete models is not directly comparable to our
results or simply absent. For other demographic groups, the comparison is even more lim-
ited. Our estimates for married men compare well to previous results in countries where
11For instance for Germany, most studies report median own-wage elasticities of around :3 for married
women (with relatively broad con￿dence intervals), which is similar to our result for the years 1998 and
2001.
15signi￿cant evidence exist (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the US), but comparison points for other countries are generally missing. The situation
is similar in the case of single individuals. There is a substantial number of estimates for
Germany, with which our results conform well. In the case of single mothers, numerous
studies on single mothers are available on the UK and the US. Our results point to more
moderate elasticities than in most of these studies, mainly for the data year and method-
ology reasons discussed above, with the exception of Blundell et al. (1992) for the UK and
Dickert et al. (1995) for the US, which report comparable estimates to ours. Our results
nicely complete the scattered evidence in the literature by providing a comprehensive and
more comparable assessment of EU-US elasticities. We discuss them in detail, before
turning back to our initial questions: how do elasticities compare across countries?
New Results and International Comparisons We ￿rst focus on married women,
the group mostly studied in the literature. For them, hour and participation elasticities
are to be found in a very narrow range :2 ￿ :3 for several countries (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). They are slightly smaller, around :1￿:2,
but signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in France (for 2001), Finland, Portugal, Sweden, the
NMS, the UK and the US. They are signi￿cantly larger, between :4 and :6, in Ireland,
Greece and Spain. Total hour elasticities follow the same pattern. Thus, our results
show that elasticities are relatively modest and hold in a narrow interval once comparable
datasets, selection and empirical strategies are used. This is an interesting result given the
substantial di⁄erences that exist across countries in terms of labor market conditions, in-
stitutions and preferences/culture. Notice that estimates are su¢ ciently precise, however,
so that di⁄erences between the three groups of countries mentioned above are statistically
signi￿cant. The nature of the remaining di⁄erences between countries is investigated in
the next section. Note that the simple intuition that elasticities are larger when female
participation is lower is broadly con￿rmed by the data, i.e., the cross-country correlation
between mean wage hour (participation) elasticities and mean worked hours (participation
rates) is around ￿0:81 (￿0:84). For married men, results are even more compressed, with
own-wage elasticities usually ranging between around :05 and :15. Estimates are usually
signi￿cantly larger than zero and precise enough to ￿nd statistical di⁄erences across some
countries, yet less pronounced than for women. The correlation between elasticities and
worked hours (participation) is only around ￿0:41 (￿0:64). Elasticities for single men
show a little more variation, usually in a range between 0 and :3 with a few exceptions
(estimates are signi￿cantly higher in Ireland and Spain). They are signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero in most cases with some exceptions including Italy and Portugal. Estimates are
slightly larger than for married men overall, which is in line with lower participation rates
among singles. We also observe some variation among single women, usually between :1
16and :4 with larger elasticities for some countries (around :6 in Belgium and Italy). The
correlation between elasticities and worked hours (participation) among single individuals
is usually smaller than for couples: :50 (:50) for women and :32 for men (:46).
Other Dimensions. In Tables 8-11, we provide additional results beyond simple mean
elasticities. For single individuals and married men, the distribution of elasticities across
income groups (quintiles) shows a clear decreasing pattern, with largest elasticities for
low-income groups. In fact, heterogeneous elasticity across di⁄erent earnings groups is
crucial for welfare analysis. Eissa et al. (2008) show that normative conclusions of pol-
icy evaluations change completely when recognizing that participation elasticities can be
signi￿cantly larger at the bottom of the distribution. Very few studies report this kind
of information however (see evidence based on structural models in Meghir and Phillips,
2008, for the UK and Aaberge et al., 2002, for Italy). Interestingly, our results general-
ize their ￿ndings for single individuals and, to some extent, for married men. Results for
married women do not show such a pattern, which has to do with joint decision in couples
￿Eissa (1995) also ￿nds that elasticities for married women may still be substantial at
the top.
For couples and single women, we also report estimates for those with and without
children. In Table 10, we notice that single mothers tend to have larger elasticities than
childless women, yet di⁄erences are usually not signi￿cant. The notable exceptions, with
very large elasticities for single mothers, concern Greece and Ireland. The same result
is observed for married couples: elasticities are usually larger for women with children,
but not markedly. The main exceptions are Greece, Ireland and Spain, i.e., the high-
elasticity group for married women.12 Finally, when two years of data are available, we
have reported elasticities based on separate estimations for each year. Time variation
is small but seems to coincide with smaller elasticities when participation increases over
time. We also ￿nd that estimates of the utility function are relatively similar across years,
which is reassuring about the fact that preferences do not change substantially over the
three-year interval. Yet they may change enough to explain time change in elasticities.
As discussed above, identi￿cation is improved when two years of data are pooled. In
that case, i.e., when assuming identical preferences for the two years, we ￿nd almost
identical elasticities for the two years, which broadly correspond to the average of the
two elasticities reported in Tables 8-11. For instance, we ￿nd own-wage elasticities of
around :18 for married women in France for both 1998 and 2001. This con￿rms that time
12Table 5 shows that the number of couples with children is large in Ireland but close to average in
Greece and Spain. Hence, higher elasticities among married women in these countries do not seem to be
driven by a higher proportion of families with children but by the higher responsiveness of mothers. This
is con￿rmed by the decomposition analysis in the next section.
17di⁄erences observed in Tables 8-11 are due to (small) changes in preferences over time
rather than other factors like changes in demographic characteristics. This is line with
the results of Heim (2007), for the US, over a much longer time period.
4.3 Robustness Checks
We have argued that models with discrete choices are very general as they do not require
imposing much constraint on preferences and allow accounting for complete tax-bene￿t
policies a⁄ecting household budgets. As discussed in Section 2, we may nonetheless check
whether our estimates are sensitive to several crucial aspects of the model speci￿cation.
Results of this extensive robustness check are provided in Tables 12 and 13 where we
focus on the own-wage and income elasticities of total hours and participation for married
women. Firstly, we simply check the sensitivity to the method used to calculate elas-
ticities. The ￿rst row of results corresponds to the baseline, that is, a 7-choice model
with quadratic utility and ￿xed costs, whereby elasticities are obtained by the frequency
method. The second row reports the average elasticity over the 250 draws used to boot-
strap standard errors in the baseline model. The third row shows elasticities obtained
with the calibration method, as previously de￿ned. Reassuringly, we see very little di⁄er-
ences in the three sets of results. Secondly, and more importantly, we check whether the
main restriction of the model, i.e., the fact that the choice set is discretized, plays some
role. The next rows in each panel report elasticities when alternative choice sets are used,
namely a discretization with 4￿ and 13￿hour choices. The model with J = 4 choices for
singles (4 ￿ 4 = 16 for couples) essentially captures the commonly agreed durations of
work: non-participation (0), part-time (20), full-time (40) and overtime (50 hours/week).
Such a model does not adapt particularly well to the hour distribution of each country.
The narrower discretization with 13 choices, from 0 to 60 hours/week with a step of 5
hours, and 13 ￿ 13 = 169 combinations for couples, is more computationally demanding.
However, it may capture more country-speci￿c hour distributions and, in fact, get closer
to a continuous speci￿cation. Interestingly, Tables 12 and 13 show that results are very
similar in all three cases (J = 4;7 and 13). Only slightly larger elasticities are observed in
the 4-point case for some countries (e.g., Belgium and Ireland). Finally, we check whether
elasticities are sensitive to the functional form at use. Similar to van Soest et al. (2001)
for the Netherlands, we experiment alternative speci￿cations by increasing the order of
the polynomial in the utility function: quadratic (baseline) then cubic and quartic. We
also change the way ￿ exibility is gained in the model by replacing ￿xed costs of work,
as used in Blundell et al. (2000), by part-time dummies, precisely at the 10, 20 and
30 hour choices, as used in van Soest (1995). These parameters may be interpreted as
job search costs for less common working hours (van Soest and Das, 2001), and hence
18include some of the labor market restriction on the choice set. Results for these di⁄erent
speci￿cations are shown in the last rows of each panel in Tables 12 and 13. The size of
elasticities hardly changes across the di⁄erent modeling choices.13 This result reinforces
our main conclusions regarding international comparison. Given the large number of
countries involved, this extensive sensitivity check also adds signi￿cantly to the literature
by increasing con￿dence in the use of discrete models.
5 Assessing the Cross-Country Di⁄erences
The evidence presented above suggests that some cross-country di⁄erence in labor supply
elasticities remains after controlling for di⁄erences in the empirical approach, the sample
selection and when focusing on a relatively narrow time period. Fully explaining cross-
country di⁄erences in labor supply and labor supply responsiveness is of course beyond
the scope of this paper.14 In this section, however, we attempt to isolate several important
factors. We still focus on married women, primarily because this group shows the most
signi￿cant variation in elasticities across countries.
5.1 Wage and Labor Supply Levels
We have seen that hour and participation elasticities are strongly correlated with mean
hour and participation levels across countries. It is possible, then, that larger elasticities
in countries like Greece, Ireland and Spain are not due to behavioral parameters but




Hc for country c. To probe the e⁄ect of these variables and their di⁄erence across




H, using country-speci￿c responsiveness
@Hc
@wc and holding hour and wage levels at their mean values over all countries (accounting
for PPP di⁄erences for wages). We focus on own-wage elasticities of total hours and report
the results in Figure 1. The upper left panel compares elasticities in the baseline (circles)
and in the "mean levels" scenario (triangular) together with 95% bootstrapped con￿dence
13The only exception seems to be Italy where higher order polynomial utility leads to larger elasticities.
The di⁄erence with the baseline is statistically signi￿cant only in the case of participation elasticities, and
partly disappears when we restrict the condition of participation to people working at least ￿ve hours a
week when calculating elasticities (indeed, there are a number of initial non-working women for whom
the predicted number of weekly hours is very small after the wage increase used to calculate elasticities
￿the additional restriction is reasonable if we consider that it is unusual to observe such small values).
14A long list of of studies have addressed this issue, sometimes in a more comprehensive manner than
in the present framework, for instance by accounting simultaneously for labor supply and fertility choices
(e.g., the recent study by Michaud and Tatsiramos, 2011). Yet no de￿nitive answer has been brought to
this di¢ cult question of country di⁄erences in working time and participation.
19intervals. The two scenarios are plotted one against the other in the upper right panel.
Lower panels decompose the "mean levels" scenario into two sub-scenarios, one where
only hours are hold at the international mean value H (lower left) and one where only
the mean wage level w (lower right) is used. Results show that high-elasticity countries
like Greece and Spain are not only characterized by lower female participation but also
by lower wage rates, so that these countries remain in the high-elasticity group even in
our "mean levels" scenario. This mechanical exercise also pushes Estonia, Hungary and
Portugal in the high-elasticity group while it reduce US elasticities to the lowest level.
This is clearly due to the fact that the NMS and Portugal (the US) have signi￿cant lower
(higher) wage rates while their female participation rates are close to the international
average. Despite these notable exceptions, the upper right panel of Figure 1 shows that
cross-country di⁄erences are preserved when elasticities are evaluated at mean values and
must therefore be explained by other factors.
5.2 Tax bene￿t Systems
There are many reasons why accounting for tax-bene￿t policies is important in our study:
(i) labor supply estimates are often used to simulate policy reforms; (ii) nonlinearity in
e⁄ective marginal tax rates and how they vary with individual characteristics (family
composition and unearned incomes) aids in identifying the model; (iii) a model ignoring
taxes may be misspeci￿ed. In addition, the size of hour elasticities may be in￿ uenced by
di⁄erences in tax-bene￿t systems across countries. Precisely, the responsiveness captured
by the derivative @Hc=@wc is calculated in our base estimates by incrementing gross wages
by 1%. In this way, the fact that high tax countries, like in the North of Europe, are
characterized by smaller net wage increments could explain smaller elasticities. To check
this point, we simulate a 1% increase in the net wage, in order to cancel out di⁄erences
in e⁄ective marginal tax rates (EMTR) across countries due to di⁄erent tax schedules
or bene￿t withdrawal rates.15 Figure 2 reports total hour elasticities in the baseline
and in this "net-wage increment" scenario. The right panel plots the two situations while
the left panel additionally indicate the 95% bootstrapped con￿dence intervals. In general,
elasticities after a 1% increase in net wage are larger ￿indeed a 1% changes in gross wages
correspond to smaller increments due to taxation. However, and most importantly, cross-
country variation is barely a⁄ected when accounting for di⁄erences in implicit taxation
15This is done by retrieving the EMTR on earnings of each individual in the household (tf;tm) as well as
EMTR on unearned income (ty) using the tax-bene￿t calculators. In other words, we numerically linearize
(2) to express disposable income, for each choice j, as Cj = wf(1 ￿ tf)H
f
j + wm(1 ￿ tm)Hm
j + (1 ￿ ty)y.
With a truly linear tax system, a 1% increase in gross and net wage is equivalent. With nonlinear tax
systems, we account for the change in tf occurring when gross wage rates are increased, in order to
simulate exactly a 1% increase in the net female wage wf(1 ￿ tf).
20of labor income. Since tax-bene￿t systems can also a⁄ect hours and participation, and,
in this way, the size of elasticities, we have also simulated a scenario where existing tax-
bene￿t systems are withdrawn completely (or, alternatively, replaced by a uniform ￿ at
tax system, which yields similar conclusions). With this counterfactual, the three groups
of countries still emerge as the main trend and con￿rm that "natural" di⁄erences exist at
least across these broad groups which are not due to tax-bene￿t institutions.
5.3 Demographic Characteristics
We ￿nally turn to the role of demographic composition. As indicated in Section 3.2,
important di⁄erences exist across countries in this respect, notably the number of children
but also the age and education structure. It is plausible that these demographic di⁄erences
have an e⁄ect on the size of elasticities. To investigate this point, we decompose di⁄erences
in elasticities across countries using an approach similar to that in Heim (2007). Let i
denote a woman￿ s age cohort, j her education group and k the number of her children.16
Let ￿ijk;c denote the wage elasticity of total hours for a woman of type ijk in country c. The








where Pijk;c denotes the proportion of women of type ijk in this country. This proportion
can be re-written as Pijk;c = Pi;cPjji;cPkjij;c where Pi;c denotes the proportion of women
in age cohort i in country c, Pjji;c the proportion of women in education group j given
membership in age cohort i, and Pkjij;c denotes the proportion of women with k children
given membership in age cohort i and education group j. Letting P denote the mean
proportion of a certain type over all countries, the proportion Pijk;c can be expressed as:
Pijk;c = P iP jjiP kjij +
￿
Pi;c ￿ P i
￿
P jjiP kjij (3)
+Pi;c
￿
Pjji;c ￿ P jji
￿
P kjij + Pi;cPjji;c
￿
Pkjij;c ￿ P kjij
￿
:
This expression can be used to decompose the mean elasticity where ￿ijk denotes the mean





























































Pi;cPjji;cPkjij;c (￿ijk;c ￿ ￿ijk)
!
:
16In our application, we retain three age groups (aged 18-35, 36-45, and 45-59), two education groups
and three family sizes (no children, 1-2 children, 3 children or more). Re￿ning with three education
groups leads to too many empty cells.
21The decomposition starts with the overall mean weighted elasticity, a term common to all
countries. The next term denotes how elasticities vary due to the di⁄erent composition of
age cohorts, keeping the distributions of education and family size constant within an age
group. The variation in elasticities due to di⁄erent education levels, keeping the distrib-
ution of the number of children within education levels constant, is captured in the third
component. The fourth term indicates the di⁄erence in elasticities due to di⁄erent distri-
butions of family size. The last component denotes the di⁄erence in elasticities left to be
explained by di⁄erent elasticities within an age-education-children cell, which can be inter-
preted as a residual di⁄erence due to other factors than composition e⁄ects (for instance,
di⁄erences in preferences). The results of this decomposition are presented in Figure 3.
We show the deviation of the country-speci￿c elasticities from the mean elasticity that
can be attributed to di⁄erences pertaining to each of the three demographic factors as
well as the residual, unexplained di⁄erence. It turns out that di⁄erences in demographic
composition regarding age and education are never statistically signi￿cant. Variation in
family size contributes very slightly to larger elasticities in some countries, including Es-
tonia, France, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Yet these di⁄erences are signi￿cant only in a
few cases, and certainly do not explain the bulk of country di⁄erences. Once controlling
for these composition e⁄ects, the residual term corresponding to "overall" di⁄erences in
labor supply responsiveness shows a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect for Greece, Ireland and
Spain (the high-elasticity group) and a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect for Finland, France,
Sweden, the UK and the US (the low-elasticity group). Therefore, we must conclude
that di⁄erences in demographic compositions between countries are not responsible for
variations in labor supply elasticities.17
5.4 Alternative Explanations
This leaves room for other explanations. Firstly, there may be genuine di⁄erences in
work preferences, possibly due to long-lasting di⁄erences in culture and the norms vis-a-
vis female labor market participation. Secondly, and in a related way, social preferences
may vary across countries and lead to di⁄erent institutions, notably regarding childcare
arrangements. It may be the case that di⁄erences in some of the estimated parame-
ters, and in particular the ￿xed costs of work, re￿ ect country heterogeneity vis-a-vis
non-simulated policies like childcare support. Di⁄erence in industrial or occupational
composition may also play a role, as employment in France and the Nordic countries is
often reported to be more stable due to better work-family reconciliation policies. The
data at hand do not allow probing such di⁄erences across countries and we leave this for
17We have checked that alternative decomposition paths ￿given the path dependency of the method ￿
give similar results. Similar conclusions are also obtained when using the "net wage" elasticities.
22future research. Finally, an explanation in terms of selection can be put forward. We ￿nd
that marriage rates are signi￿cantly higher in high-elasticity countries (the proportion
of married women over single women is 6:3 in Ireland or 5:6 in Spain, compared to an
average of 3:9 over all countries under study). Hence, it could be that married women in
these countries cover a large range of the distribution of elasticities while the relatively
smaller fraction of women who marry in France, the Nordic countries, the UK and the
US are in the low range of this distribution. If this was the case, one would expect to ￿nd
larger elasticities among single women in the latter group of countries. Our main results
show that it is not the case ￿the cross-country correlation between elasticities of married
and single women is positive (:25) ￿so this possible explanation can be ruled out.
6 Conclusions
The present paper presents new evidence on labor supply elasticities for 17 European
countries and the US. Estimates are more comparable than usual results in the literature
given the e⁄ort of adopting a common empirical approach. The main lesson from the
results is that elasticities are more modest than usually thought, and international di⁄er-
ences are relatively small. We also show that the remaining variation across countries has
little to do with selection into marriage, di⁄erences in tax-bene￿t systems or heterogene-
ity in demographic composition. It may rather re￿ ect di⁄erences in individual and social
preferences across countries, and primarily di⁄erences in work preferences and childcare
policies, as captured by variation in labor supply parameters. As far as married women
are concerned, these di⁄erences contribute to more intermittent labor force participation
patterns in Greece, Ireland and Spain as opposed to more consistent participation and
more constant hours in other countries and notably France, the Nordic countries, the UK
and the US. This result corroborates the ￿ndings of Heim (2007) regarding time variation
of elasticities in the US.18
Future work should consider both time and country variation. The present study was
based on data years for which policy simulations were available within EUROMOD, yet
future research should attempt to span a longer period for many countries. Also, a better
modeling of demand-side constraints could improve the results, which was not possible
with the data at hand. The bias concerns primarily single individuals, for whom the share
of involuntarily unemployment is the highest, but not so much married women and single
mothers, two groups who frequently choose non-participation on a voluntary basis due to
18Considering time rather than cross-country variation, Heim (2007) also ￿nds that higher participation
rates coincide with much smaller elasticities, and that this trend is not due to demographic changes but
more likely to shifts in work preferences.
23￿xed costs of work and preferences (see Bingley and Walker, 1997, and Bargain et al., 2006,
for an extensive analysis of biases a⁄ecting elasticities in that case). A more comprehensive
measure of elasticities would also account for the interaction between demand and supply
(see Peichl and Siegloch, 2010) or for general equilibrium e⁄ects.
Despite these restrictions, we believe that the estimates provided in this paper can be
useful for researchers who want to implement optimal tax or CGE models in a compara-
tive framework and need to refer to "reasonable" values from the literature (e.g., Jacobs,
2009, on reassessing Prescott￿ s argument). In particular, our results can be exploited for
applications in the ￿eld of taxation (see also Blundell et al., 2008). Two recent studies,
Immervoll et al. (2007 and 2011), have conducted international comparisons of redistrib-
utive systems in Europe and their results could be reassessed in the light of the estimates
provided in the present study. Firstly, Immervoll et al. (2007) measure the implicit
cost of redistribution using plausible elasticities and sensitivity analyses ￿but without
information on actual cross-country di⁄erences. Secondly, they assume that participation
elasticity decreases with income levels. The implications of this assumption are crucial for
welfare analysis (Eissa et al., 2008). Notably, the optimality of policies that support the
working poor, compared to traditional "demogrant" policies, depends fundamentally on
it. While very limited evidence exists, the present study broadly supports this assumption
for single individuals and married men, providing a precise range of estimates for each
country. Thirdly, international comparisons of the tax treatment of couples by Immervoll
et al. (2011) ￿essentially the long-studied issue of joint versus individual taxation ￿could
be reevaluated using our new evidence on couples￿labor supply elasticities. Related to
this point, Heckman (1993) noted "whether labor supply behavior by sex will converge
to equality as female labor-force participation continues to increase is an open question".
This question has remained open up to now, and the present study contributes to answer-
ing it. In fact, we can draw from our results that male-female di⁄erentials in participation
rates are strongly negatively correlated with male-female di⁄erentials in participation elas-
ticities (corr = ￿:89).19 Hence, the Ramsey argument against high implicit taxation of
secondary earners and the subsequent deadweight loss from joint "e⁄ective" taxation ￿
which is more frequent than mere joint taxation since many bene￿ts and tax credits are
means-tested on household income ￿can now be assessed on the basis of comparable
estimates for many countries.
19In Nordic countries, the gender participation gap is below 10 points and coincides with insigni￿cant
di⁄erences in labor supply elasticities. In Spain or Greece, men￿ s participation is still above women￿ s by
a large margin (around 50 points) and the gender di⁄erence in elasticities is signi￿cant and larger than
:45. Most EU countries and the US are somewhere between these two extreme cases.
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Figure 3: Deviation to the Mean Hour Elasticity due to Demographic Characteristics
31Table 1: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Couples
hours particip. hours particip. female male
Austria Dearing et al. (2007) SILC (2004), at least 1 child aged <10 D QU; M ITABENA [.07, .19] @
Belgium Orsini (2006, 2007) $ Panel Survey of Belgian Households
(2001),  working age
D QU and GU + PTD; J MODETE [.16, .31] [.10, .19] [.10, .18] [.08, .15]
Finland Kuismainen (1997) § # LFS (1989), survey & tax register; 25-60 C SL, R PL [0, .06] [.11, .27]
Bargain & Orsini (2006) $ IDS (1998), working age, men all
employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.10, .18] [.10, .17]*
France Bourguignon & Magnac (1990)
§ # £





Laroque & Salanie (2002) matched LFS-Tax returns (1999),
women aged 25-49
D joint particip. & wage;
unempl. & min. wage
own calc. (.96) / -.11*
Choné, Le Blanc & Robert-
Bobée(2003)
matched LFS-Tax returns (1997),
working age, children aged <6
D QU, joint wage & CC;
min. wage
own calc. 1.05 [.8, .9] @ -.19 / -.18*
Bargain & Orsini (2006) $ HBS (1994/5), working age women,
men all employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.52, .65] [.46, .58]*




no taxation [.24, .59] [-.35, -.06]
Germany Kaiser et al. (1992) § £ SOEP (1983), working age C LL C, NC, D 1.04 -.04 -.18 -.28
Bonin, Kempe & Schneider
(2002) # $
SOEP (2000), working age, W & E D TL + PTD; J IZAmod .27 .20 .21 .19 .15 / .09 .01 / 0
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) $ SOEP (2002), working age, W & E D TU + PTD; J STSM [.16, .55] @ [.07, .21] @ [.11, .38] @ [.07, .23] @
Haan & Steiner (2005) $ SOEP (2002), working age, W & E, one-
or two-earner couples
D TU + PTD; J STSM [.08, .56] [.04, .20] [.08, .46] [.07, .26]
Bargain & Orsini (2006) $ SOEP (1998), working age, men all
employed, W & E
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.31, .45] [.27, .38]*
Clauss & Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/5), couples aged 20-65 D TU; J STSM .37 .14 .24 .16
Wrohlich (2006) SOEP (2002), working age, W & E D TU; J; CC STSM [.14, .53] @ [.06, .16] @
Dearing et al. (2007) SOEP (2004), at least 1 child aged <10,
W
D QU; M STSM [.13, .24] @
Bargain et al. (2009) SOEP (2003), working age, potential one-
or two-earner
D/H QU + PTD, R; J STSM [.19, .34] [.08, .20] [.05, .08] [.04, .13]
Fuest et al. (2008) # SOEP (2004), working age, W & E,
potential one- or two-earner
D TU+PTD;J FiFoSiM 0.38 0.15 0.20 0.14
Authors: for references, see § Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), # Evers et al. (2008), £ Meghir and Phillips (2008), $ Orsini (2006)
Tax-benefit
Income elast. Female wage elast. Male wage elast.
Model Specification Country Authors Data selection
Elasticities: brackets indicate the range of values for all specifications (or the confidence interval when available). '@ indicates that the range also includes values for different age and number of children. Particip. =
participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in employment rate in % points, except when indicated by * (in that case, % increase in employment rate).
Data: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS), EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (SILC). For Germany: West (W), East (E).
Model: C = continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981 type); T = tobit model; D = discrete-choice model (van Soest 1995 type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities
vary across individuals);  H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment).
Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL) or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU) or generalized Stone-Geary (GU); random
preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well additional flexibility, either through fixed costs (FC) or part-time dummies (PTD). Models are male-chauvinistic (M) or account for joint decision in couples (J).
Welfare programme participation (W). Childcare costs (CC).
Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C); nonconvexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget function can be
used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the microsimulation model when it is known.
32Table 2: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Couples (cont.)
hours particip. hours particip. female male
Ireland Callan & van Soest (1996) IDS (1987), desired hours D/H TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.50, .85] .31 /.20* [.10, .20]
Callan, van Soest & Walsh
(2009)
Living in Ireland Survey (1995), desired
hours
D TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.71, .90] .49 [.21, .31] .20 /.21*
Italy Colombino & Del Boca
(1990) § #
Turin Survey of Couples (1979), working
age
C LL PL 1.18 .64 .52
Aaberge et al. (1999)  § £ Survey of Income and Wealth (1987), aged
20-70
A non-linear hours, exog.
wage and unearned inc.
own calc. .74 .65 .053 .046 / -.014 / -.003
Aaberge et al. (2002, 04) Survey of Income and Wealth (1993) A GU; J own calc. .66 .51 .12 .02
Netherlands van Soest et al. (1990) § # Labor mobility survey (1985), working age C/D LL, R; discrete wage-hours
combinations
PL [.35, .59] .12 [.15, .19] -.23 -.01
van Soest (1995) § # SOEP (1987) D TU + PTD, R; J own calc. [.42, .54] - [.05, .09] - .008 -.03
van Soest & Das (2001) $ SOEP (1995), aged 16-64, desired hours D TU + FC, R; J own calc. [.67, .74] - [.07, .10] -
van Soest et al. (2002) # Dutch SOEP (1995), aged 16-64, desired
hours
D QU (+ more flexible) +
FC, R; simult. wage
estimation, J
own calc. [.83, 1.36] [.35, .58]*
Spain García and Suárez (2003) ECHP (1994-95), aged 16-65, obs. and
desired hours
C LL taxes .37 1.51* -.06
Fernández-Val (2003) ECHP (1994-99), aged<65 and in work C unitary/collective model no taxation .31
Crespo (2006) ECHP (1994-99), aged<65 and in work C QL, unitary/collective no taxation .14 .01
Labeaga, Oliver & Spadaro
(2008)
ECHP (1995), working age
D
QU + FC; J GLAD-
HISPANIA
.29 .26 .01 .11
Sweden Blomquist (1983) § # Level of Living Survey (1974), all
employed, aged 25-55
C LL, R PL .008 -.03
Flood & MaCurdy (1992) §
# £
Household Market-Nonmarket Survey
(1983), all employed, 25-65
C LL and SL, R PL, D [.-.25, .21] [.-.01, .04]
Blomquist & Hansson-
Brusewitz (1990) § # £
Level of Living Survey (1981), all
employed, aged 25-55
C LL and QL, R PL, C and NC [.38, .77] [.08, .13] [-.24, -.03]
Blomquist & Newey (2002)
# £




PL [.04, .12} -.02
Flood, Hansen & Wahlberg
(2004)
Household Income Survey (1993), aged 18-
64
D
TU, R; stigma of W own calc. .12 0 -0.017 -0.003
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data, Income
Distribution Survey, 1999
D TU, R FASIT .18 .15 .06 0
UK Arellano & Meghir (1992) #
£
British FES and LFS (1983), aged 20-59,
with pre-school children (upper bound for
all children)
C SL + FC, search costs,
endogenous wage and
unearned income (IV)
PL [.29, .71] - [-.13, -.40]
Arrufat & Zabalza (1986) §
# £
British General Household Survey (1974),
aged <60
C CES utility based labor
supply, R
PL [.62 - 2.03] 1.41 -.2 / -.14
Blundell & Walker (1986) § FES (1980), all employed, aged 18-59 C Gorman polar form and
translog hours, R
PL .024 -.287
Blundell, Ham &  Meghir
(1987) £
FES (1981), aged 16-60 T/H non-linear labor supply,
unemployment risk
own calc. [.04, .08]
Blundell, Duncan & Meghir
(1998) § £
FES (1978-1992), 20-50, young children
(lower bound if no child)
C generalized LES, R PL [.13, .37] @ - [-.19, 0] @
Blundell et al. (2000) # Family Resources Survey (1994-96) D QU + FC, R, W TAXBEN [.11 - .17]
Note: see previous table. For Spain, several additional references are cited in García and Suárez (2003) which point to similar elasticities as in the basic model in this study.
Model Specification Country Author Data selection Tax-benefit
Income elast. Female wage elast. Male wage elast.
33Table 3: Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe: Single Individuals
hours particip.
Finland Bargain & Orsini (2006) $ IDS (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.18, .34] [.18, .33]
France Bargain & Orsini (2006) $ HBS (1994/5), aged 25-49, SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.08, .14] [.04, .07]
Laroque & Salanie (2001) LFS-Tax return matched dataset (1999),
women aged 25-49, no civil servants,
SW
D participation (and full/part-time) model,
simultaneous wage and labor supply estimation,
probability of unemployment, min. wage
own calc. {.36}
Germany Bargain & Orsini (2006) $ SOEP (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.09, .18] [.08, .15]
Steiner & Wrohlich (2004) $ SOEP (2003), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.20, .36] [.05, .09]
Haan & Steiner (2005) $ SOEP (2002), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.02, .24] [.01, .10]
SM [.08, .31] [.04, .28]
Clauss & Schnabel (2006) $ SOEP (2004/5), aged 20-65, SW D STSM .38 .18
SM .23 .17
Bargain et al. (2009) SOEP (2003),  working age, SW D/H STSM [.06, .16] [.04, .10]
SM [.10, .20] [.05, .12]
Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, SW D TU + PTD FiFoSiM 0.28 0.13
SM 0.28 0.17
Italy Aaberge et al. (2002) Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (1993), SW
A own calc. .10 .06
SM .11 .08
Netherlands Euwals & Van Soest (1999) # Dutch SOEP (1988), actual and desired
hours, SW
D own calc. [.03, .45]
SM [.03, .18]
Sweden Andren (2003) HINK (1997-98), SP D QU + FC; simulat. with W and CC own calc. [ .55, .87] .50 -0.1
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data, IDS, 1999,
SP
D TU, R FASIT .51 .35
UK Walker (1990) £ FES (1979-84), SP D participation model benefits only .70
Ermisch & Wright (1991) £ General household survey (1973-82), SP D participation model, demand-side
controls
simplified system 1.7
Jenkins (1992) £ Lone parents survey (1989), SP D+H two positive hour choices,
unemployment risk, FC
benefits only 1.8
Blundell, Duncan & Meghir
(1992) § £
FES (1981-1986), SP C marginal rate of substitution function,
endogenous wage and income
taxation only .34
Brewer et al. (2006) £ FES (1995-2002), aged <60, SP D QU + FC, joint with W and CC, R TAXBEN 1.02




Country Author Data selection Model Specification Tax-benefit
TU + FC, R
TU + PTD
QU + PTD; involuntary unemployment
Elasticities: brackets indicate the range obtained in function of the specification at use, or the confidence interval when available. Particip. = participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in
employment rate in percentage points.
Model: C = continuous LS (Hausman 1981 type); T = tobit model; D = discrete model (van Soest, 1995 type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities
vary across individuals); H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment).
Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL) or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic (QU), translog (TU) or generalized Stone-Geary
(GU); random preferences (R); fixed costs (FC); welfare participation (W); childcare costs (CC)
Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C); nonconvexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget
function can be used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the microsimulation model when it is known.
Data & Selection: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS); Selection: single
women (SW), single men (SM), single parents/mothers (SP)
GU
34Table 4: Labor Supply Elasticities for the US
hours particip. hours particip. female male
Cogan (1981) £
US National Longitudinal Study of
Mature Women 1967, married
women aged 30-35
C
SL; reservation hours to account for FC; no
tax-benefit
[.86 , 2.40] [.16 , .66]
Hausman (1981) # £ PSID 1975, married women C LL, PL (C and NC: FC) [.90 , 1.00] [-.13 , -.12]
Triest (1990) £
PSID 1983, married women, aged
25-55
C LL; C and PL; taxes and benefits [.03 , .28] [-.15 , -.19]
MaCurdy, Green &
Paarsch (1990) £
PSID 1975: married men, aged 25-
55
C





SIPP 1990, single mothers, no assets D joint program and labor force participation .35
Pencavel (1998) £ CPS 1975-94, women aged 25-60 C Log-L; no tax-benefit [.77,.1.80]
Hoynes (1996)
SIPP panel, 1984, married men and
women with children
D
Stone-Geary; stigma from AFDC; tax-
benefit system; FC
- .46 - .12
Keane and Moffitt
(1998) £
1994 SIPP, single mothers, no assets D
joint labor supply and welfare program
participation; benefits but no tax
.96
Pencavel (2002) £ CPS 1999, married and single men C LL; no tax-benefit [.12,.25]
Devereux (2003) # Census and PSID, all men C Log-L, no tax-benefit [– .022, .017] [– .061, .001]
Devereux (2004) #
PUMS 1980,1990, married couples
(participating men)
C Log-L, no tax-benefit [.17,.38] [.00,.07]
Eissa & Hoynes (2004)
#
CPS 1985 to 1997, less educated
married couples with children
D Participation Probit, joint estimation 0.27 .03 -.039 -.007
Blau & Kahn (2007) #
CPS 1980, married men and women
age 25-54
C Log-L [.77,.88] [.01,.07] .004 .001
CPS 1990 C Log-L [.58,.64] [.10,.14] .002 .002
CPS 2000 C Log-L [.36,.41] [.04,.10] .001 .002
Heim (2009) PSID 2001, couples
quadratic utility with continuous labor
supply, J, FC, R
[.24,.33] [.07,.18] [.04,.07] [.00,.003] [-.007, -.006]
[-.0007,-
.0004}
Bishop et al. (2009) CPS, 1979-2003, sing. women SL, participation, some account for tax




-.014 (1979) to -
.019 (2003)





-.05 (1979) to -
.015 (2003)
Authors: for references, see § Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), # Evers et al. (2008), £ Meghir and Phillips (2008)
Elasticities: brackets indicate ranges of values over different specifications, or reported confidence intervals. Participation elasticities ("particip"): increase in employ. rate in % points.
Income elast.
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS), Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
Model: C= continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981 type); D= discrete-choice model (often a simple participation probit)
Specification: Hausman labor supply is either linear (LL), log-linear (Log-L) or semi-log (SL); random preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well as fixed costs (FC). Models sometimes account for
piecewise-linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C) or nonconvexities (NC), and differentiable budget constraint (D).
Specification
Female wage elast. Male wage elast.
Authors Data selection Model
35Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (Selected Samples)
Country AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
Year 98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98 01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Data ECHP ECHP IDS HBS SHIW SOEP ECHP HBS HBS HBS CPS
Couples
Women
Age 39 39 40 38 40 38 39 39 39 38 40 42 39 38 37 39 39 37 38 39 41 43 38 39 39
Tertiary educ. .26 .09 .10 .38 .42 .20 .26 .30 .33 .24 .12 .21 .09 .27 .12 .17 .26 .29 .35 .31 .36 .40 .19 .19 .33
Hourly wage 9.9 11.4 12.8 13.3 10.4 10.2 10.1 11.4 11.8 3.8 7.6 10.8 7.4 11.4 4.3 5.6 6.4 8.6 11.3 10.3 11.6 2.0 2.1 2.3 13.8
Weekly hours 17.2 24.1 24.5 28.6 31.7 23.2 23.9 19.7 20.8 13.3 11.3 17.7 15.1 18.6 27.5 12.2 15.0 21.3 22.6 28.3 30.6 33.4 28.8 23.2 26.9
Weekly hours* 29.9 32.8 32.4 34.4 37.4 33.9 33.0 29.8 29.6 36.6 29.4 29.5 33.0 25.4 38.0 34.5 34.9 30.3 30.3 32.3 33.0 38.9 38.9 37.9 38.1
Particip. rate .57 .73 .75 .83 .85 .68 .73 .66 .70 .36 .38 .60 .46 .73 .72 .35 .43 .70 .75 .88 .93 .86 .74 .61 .71
Men
Age 42 41 42 40 42 40 41 41 41 42 42 44 42 41 40 41 41 39 40 42 43 45 41 41 41
Tertiary educ. .26 .12 .13 .37 .38 .19 .25 .38 .39 .26 .18 .23 .10 .34 .09 .23 .27 .28 .31 .30 .32 .23 .17 .14 .32
Hourly wage 14.9 14.3 15.6 16.4 14.0 12.6 12.9 15.3 16.2 5.4 10.9 14.9 9.2 16.3 5.5 7.3 8.2 12.8 16.6 13.5 15.8 2.7 2.8 3.2 20.3
Weekly hours 40.8 39.2 39.7 37.5 37.8 38.5 38.3 35.3 35.5 38.5 32.4 37.0 36.3 39.2 40.8 37.6 39.7 37.8 37.9 35.6 36.8 36.0 37.7 33.3 41.1
Weekly hours* 42.1 42.0 41.7 40.9 41.5 41.4 40.7 38.1 38.2 42.6 41.6 40.4 39.9 40.7 42.2 43.1 42.6 44.3 42.8 38.5 38.3 40.9 42.1 38.7 44.4
Particip. rate .97 .93 .95 .92 .91 .93 .94 .92 .93 .90 .78 .91 .91 .96 .97 .87 .93 .85 .89 .93 .96 .88 .89 .86 .93
# children 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5
1(children 0-2) .13 .14 .14 .18 .15 .19 .18 .13 .11 .10 .23 .17 .14 .18 .17 .14 .16 .20 .17 .18 .15 .03 .15 .15 .19
Single women
Age 40 41 42 38 42 39 40 38 38 43 40 41 42 39 44 42 42 38 39 37 40 45 43 42 40
Tertiary educ. .32 .10 .11 .35 .38 .24 .31 .33 .39 .24 .13 .19 .12 .33 .15 .31 .35 .25 .32 .29 .34 .35 .22 .23 .27
Hourly wage 11.3 11.6 13.3 13.2 10.9 10.1 10.6 12.4 12.3 3.6 7.4 9.7 8.0 11.6 5.0 6.3 7.2 8.9 11.8 10.6 11.8 2.0 2.6 2.5 13.4
Weekly hours 29.3 25.2 27.2 27.5 31.0 29.7 28.8 25.8 26.9 21.9 17.8 22.7 26.8 25.2 29.7 26.7 28.0 20.3 22.3 25.8 29.7 33.6 33.7 26.2 32.7
Weekly hours* 34.4 35.3 34.6 34.5 37.9 35.1 34.9 33.1 33.2 39.3 34.9 31.2 35.2 31.8 37.7 37.6 36.2 33.1 33.8 32.1 33.0 39.3 39.4 37.1 40.4
Particip. rate 0.85 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.56 0.51 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.71 0.78 0.61 0.66 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.71 0.81
# children 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0
Single men
Age 38 40 43 37 39 38 39 38 38 38 41 41 39 37 40 40 40 38 40 35 38 40 41 41 40
Tertiary educ. .26 .09 .07 .34 .27 .22 .31 .36 .34 .34 .20 .17 .16 .35 .06 .25 .29 .31 .35 .21 .27 .14 .17 .14 .27
Hourly wage 13.6 12.3 14.0 15.0 11.7 11.3 11.2 14.3 14.5 4.7 8.7 10.4 8.6 13.0 4.5 6.6 7.2 11.0 13.9 11.3 13.4 1.7 2.5 2.4 15.9
Weekly hours 37.0 35.0 34.7 31.9 30.7 33.7 33.2 31.7 32.6 31.7 25.3 27.4 28.5 35.0 33.2 28.0 33.2 29.3 32.3 26.6 30.9 30.7 33.0 23.1 36.2
Weekly hours* 39.7 40.6 41.3 38.2 40.5 39.1 37.8 36.8 36.5 41.3 41.0 37.9 37.8 37.8 42.1 40.4 40.6 42.2 40.4 34.5 34.9 40.4 41.0 36.8 42.8
Particip. rate 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.77 0.62 0.72 0.75 0.93 0.79 0.69 0.82 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.88 0.76 0.80 0.63 0.84
# children 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Sample size 1,323 1,933 1,480 1,912 4,813 6,377 5,764 4,490 4,164 1,634 1,898 1,502 3,014 2,569 1,812 2,857 2,344 3,197 3,070 9,861 7,499 1,547 2,683 14,695 38,119
* Participants only
Selected sample: household with working-age adults (either employed, unemployed or inactive). For this table and the following ones: Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005; Countries are: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium,
DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland, IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands, PT=Portugal, SP=Spain, UK=the United Kingdom, SW=Sweden, EE=Estonia,
HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, US=the United States. Reported years correspond to the period when income information was collected. Datasets are: ECHP=European Community Household Panel, PSB=Panel Survey
on Belgian Households, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=German or Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, LIS=Living in Ireland Survey, SHIW=Survey of Households Income and
Wealth, FES=Family Expenditure Survey, CPS=Current Population Survey. Hourly wage rates are converted in 2001 euros (predicted for non-participants).
PSB HBS SOEP LIS ECHP IDS FES
36Table 6: Distributions of Weekly Worked Hours (Selected Samples)
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
All males
0 - 4 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.12
5 - 14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
15 - 24 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
25 - 34 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03
35 - 44 0.72 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.66 0.67 0.51 0.66 0.70 0.59 0.43 0.59 0.66
45 - 54 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10
55+ 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.04
All females
0 - 4 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.61 0.59 0.35 0.51
5 - 14 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01
15 - 24 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.10
25 - 34 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.04
35 - 44 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.64 0.42 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.25 0.19 0.27 0.31
45 - 54 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
55+ 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US Mean
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
All males
0 - 4 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.11
5 - 14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
15 - 24 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03
25 - 34 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06
35 - 44 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.61 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.65 0.73 0.67 0.78 0.56 0.62
45 - 54 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.10
55+ 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.06
All females
0 - 4 0.27 0.23 0.60 0.55 0.32 0.27 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.36 0.26 0.32
5 - 14 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04
15 - 24 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.11
25 - 34 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.11
35 - 44 0.20 0.44 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.71 0.60 0.57 0.49 0.38
45 - 54 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.03
55+ 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01
This table represents the distribution of weekly working hours for our selected samples.
37Table 7: Goodness of Fit: Hour Mean and Distributions
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Male observed 40.3 39.0 39.4 38.3 37.5 38.2 37.0 35.3 35.6 37.9 31.9 36.7 36.0
predicted 40.5 38.1 38.5 38.4 37.0 38.1 37.0 35.6 35.6 37.6 31.3 36.2 36.5
gap % 0.4% -2.3% -2.5% 0.2% -1.3% -0.1% -0.2% 0.9% -0.1% -0.8% -1.9% -1.4% 1.4%
Female observed 16.8 24.0 24.3 29.5 32.0 23.1 23.2 19.6 20.7 13.3 11.0 17.5 15.5
predicted 17.3 24.2 24.2 29.1 31.3 22.9 23.2 19.6 21.1 12.6 10.7 17.2 15.4
gap % 2.6% 0.7% -0.1% -1.1% -2.3% -0.8% -0.2% -0.1% 2.0% -5.1% -2.7% -1.5% -1.0%
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Male observed 39.2 39.6 36.8 38.9 37.1 37.1 35.8 37.1 35.9 37.4 33.3 41.1
predicted 39.1 39.8 36.3 38.2 37.6 37.9 36.2 37.2 36.4 37.3 33.3 40.9
gap % -0.2% 0.4% -1.4% -1.8% 1.3% 2.3% 1.2% 0.2% 1.4% -0.2% 0.3% -0.4%
Female observed 18.2 26.4 12.0 14.7 20.8 22.1 28.4 30.7 33.2 28.6 23.4 27.0
predicted 18.3 28.2 12.3 13.5 21.2 22.7 28.7 30.8 33.7 28.6 23.5 26.6





























































38Table 8: Labor Supply Elasticities: Couples
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Women in couples
Own-wage elasticity
Hours .34 .28 .31 .30 .13 .23 .13 .31 .31 .62 .47 .32 .33
(.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.03)
quintile 1 .34 .25 .34 .28 .12 .21 .09 .35 .31 .58 .43 .39 .30
quintile 2 .32 .23 .27 .31 .11 .20 .09 .30 .30 .58 .38 .33 .29
quintile 3 .32 .25 .29 .26 .12 .21 .10 .30 .31 .59 .40 .28 .29
quintile 4 .33 .29 .31 .27 .14 .24 .14 .30 .31 .61 .42 .30 .32
quintile 5 .37 .41 .36 .36 .16 .27 .21 .30 .34 .68 .73 .30 .40
with children .35 .28 .30 .31 .14 .24 .13 .31 .34 .63 .56 .35 .31
no children .31 .29 .34 .28 .12 .20 .12 .30 .28 .53 .23 .21 .38
Hours: participants only* .05 .05 .05 .06 .01 .03 .02 .06 .08 .03 .08 .05 .05
Participation** .27 .22 .23 .25 .12 .19 .10 .24 .22 .57 .42 .27 .28
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Cross-wage elasticity
Hours -.13 -.07 -.05 -.14 -.07 -.11 -.07 -.19 -.17 -.09 -.22 -.14 .04
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Participation** -.10 -.05 -.04 -.11 -.05 -.08 -.05 -.13 -.11 -.09 -.17 -.10 .03
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Income elasticity
Hours -.001 -.002 -.002 -.004 .001 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.006 -.004 -.008 .007 .001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.004)
Participation** -.001 -.002 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.007 .007 .001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.004)
Men in couples
Own-wage elasticity
Hours .07 .13 .12 .15 .10 .09 .06 .13 .14 .11 .26 .15 .04
(.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01)
quintile 1 .08 .15 .16 .20 .12 .10 .05 .19 .18 .12 .41 .21 .03
quintile 2 .08 .11 .12 .16 .10 .09 .05 .12 .13 .11 .26 .16 .03
quintile 3 .07 .10 .11 .11 .09 .09 .05 .13 .13 .11 .21 .14 .03
quintile 4 .07 .12 .10 .11 .08 .08 .06 .12 .12 .11 .18 .12 .04
quintile 5 .07 .16 .11 .18 .10 .08 .09 .10 .12 .13 .26 .14 .06
Hours: participants only* .02 .02 .02 .02 .00 .02 .02 .03 .03 .01 .00 .03 -.01
Participation** .05 .10 .09 .13 .10 .07 .04 .10 .11 .10 .27 .12 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Cross-wage elasticity
Hours -.01 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.04 -.07 -.02 -.04
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Participation** .00 -.01 .00 -.03 -.02 .00 .00 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.03
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00)
Income elasticity
Hours .000 -.002 -.002 -.003 .001 .000 .000 -.003 -.004 -.005 -.010 -.004 -.017
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Participation** .000 -.001 -.001 -.002 .001 .001 .000 -.002 -.002 -.003 -.008 -.002 -.013
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.002)
Note: elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
* pure intensive margin, ** pure extensive margin
39Table 9: Labor Supply Elasticities: Couples (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Women in couples
Own-wage elasticity
Hours .32 .14 .63 .51 .12 .09 .16 .11 .08 .15 .10 .14
(.03) (.02) (.05) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.00) (.00)
quintile 1 .24 .13 .45 .42 .09 .08 .19 .16 .07 .19 .09 .14
quintile 2 .25 .11 .47 .41 .09 .07 .19 .14 .08 .17 .09 .14
quintile 3 .32 .12 .54 .44 .10 .08 .17 .12 .08 .15 .09 .14
quintile 4 .34 .13 .64 .51 .12 .10 .15 .10 .09 .14 .10 .14
quintile 5 .45 .21 .93 .72 .17 .14 .12 .06 .09 .12 .12 .15
with children .33 .16 .68 .59 .13 .11 .18 .11 .07 .16 .10 .15
no children .31 .10 .46 .35 .10 .07 .14 .12 .11 .11 .12 .13
Hours: participants only* .13 .05 .06 .08 .03 .02 .04 .05 .01 .01 .01 .02
Participation** .20 .11 .53 .43 .08 .07 .11 .07 .06 .13 .09 .12
(.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00)
Cross-wage elasticity
Hours -.08 .00 -.05 .03 -.04 -.07 -.04 -.03 -.03 .04 .08 .01
(.04) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00)
Participation** -.05 .00 -.05 .02 -.02 -.04 .00 -.01 -.02 .04 .08 .01
(.03) (.01) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00)
Income elasticity
Hours -.001 .000 -.001 .000 -.003 -.002 -.008 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Participation** -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.001 -.004 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Men in couples
Own-wage elasticity
Hours .06 .04 .14 .08 .06 .03 .11 .07 .08 .08 .04 .08
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00)
quintile 1 .08 .03 .13 .06 .06 .03 .16 .12 .08 .08 .03 .09
quintile 2 .05 .03 .11 .06 .05 .03 .15 .10 .08 .08 .03 .08
quintile 3 .06 .03 .13 .07 .06 .04 .12 .07 .08 .08 .03 .08
quintile 4 .05 .03 .16 .08 .06 .03 .10 .05 .08 .08 .04 .07
quintile 5 .06 .06 .19 .11 .07 .04 .05 .02 .08 .07 .05 .07
Hours: participants only* .01 .01 .00 .01 -.01 -.01 .02 .02 .01 .00 .00 .03
Participation** .06 .03 .14 .07 .08 .06 .09 .05 .07 .07 .03 .04
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.009) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.002) (.00)
Cross-wage elasticity
Hours -.05 -.03 -.05 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 .02
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00)
Participation** -.03 -.01 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.02 .01 .00 -.02 .00 -.01 .01
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Income elasticity
Hours -.002 .000 -.002 -.002 -.006 -.003 -.006 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .001
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Participation** -.001 .000 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.002 -.002 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .001
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Note: elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
* pure intensive margin, ** pure extensive margin
40Table 10: Labor Supply Elasticities: Single Women
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Wage elasticity
Hours all .14 .29 .59 .13 .21 .18 .12 .25 .18 .41 .39 .37 .67
(.05) (.05) (.08) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.03) (.05) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.09)
quintile 1 .18 .40 1.23 .26 .38 .26 .22 .32 .23 .68 .52 .63 1.33
quintile 2 .23 .36 .69 .39 .25 .25 .16 .34 .23 .42 .60 .45 .84
quintile 3 .16 .29 .47 .02 .21 .20 .12 .28 .20 .36 .37 .45 .51
quintile 4 .08 .19 .45 .04 .16 .17 .12 .22 .14 .33 .17 .25 .43
quintile 5 .02 .26 .24 .05 .07 .05 .01 .11 .12 .38 .53 .15 .34
with children .14 .33 .56 .15 .22 .22 .10 .22 .24 .57 .64 .45 .53
no children .13 .27 .60 .12 .20 .16 .14 .26 .15 .30 .24 .29 .81
Hours: participants only* .01 .00 .07 -.02 .00 .02 .02 .03 .01 -.01 .05 .06 .05
Participation** .13 .25 .41 .18 .20 .15 .09 .22 .17 .43 .34 .24 .58
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.10) (.07) (.06) (.08)
Income elasticity
Hours -.001 -.013 -.004 .012 .029 .001 .001 .003 -.006 -.010 -.007 -.003 .019
(.000) (.002) (.001) (.006) (.005) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.001) (.023)
Participation** .000 -.007 -.002 .015 .028 .003 .002 .005 -.003 -.009 -.006 -.001 .019
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.006) (.005) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.018)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Wage elasticity
Hours all .16 .08 .13 .20 .40 .31 .27 .21 .12 .08 .09 .23
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01)
quintile 1 .16 -.02 .15 .37 .45 .38 .36 .27 .12 .14 .10 .22
quintile 2 .23 .02 .13 .23 .48 .38 .37 .30 .13 .08 .09 .34
quintile 3 .17 .03 .15 .16 .47 .38 .30 .23 .12 .07 .09 .27
quintile 4 .18 .10 .11 .15 .47 .33 .24 .18 .13 .07 .08 .21
quintile 5 .07 .23 .10 .12 .24 .15 .11 .07 .11 .07 .08 .15
with children .12 .07 .13 .26 .39 .35 .23 .21 .12 .09 .09 .24
no children .17 .10 .13 .16 .41 .29 .28 .21 .12 .08 .09 .23
Hours: participants only* .02 .04 .00 .04 .04 .04 .03 .06 .01 .01 .01 .03
Participation** .11 .05 .14 .19 .26 .24 .18 .14 .11 .07 .07 .19
(.02) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.00)
Income elasticity
Hours -.003 .000 -.007 -.007 -.005 -.002 .024 .013 .000 .009 .001 -.004
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.005) (.003) (.000) (.006) (.000) (.000)
Participation** -.002 .000 -.006 -.005 -.002 -.001 .024 .014 .000 .010 .001 -.003
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.002) (.000) (.006) (.000) (.000)
Note: elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
* pure intensive margin, ** pure extensive margin
41Table 11: Labor Supply Elasticities: Single Men
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Wage elasticity
Hours all .14 .26 .28 .26 .33 .14 .14 .14 .20 .19 .33 .67 .22
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.08) (.09) (.10) (.11)
quintile 1 .16 .54 .53 .31 .83 .12 .14 .21 .30 .16 1.17 1.85 .44
quintile 2 .15 .22 .36 .30 .24 .10 .11 .18 .19 .18 .30 .98 .23
quintile 3 .13 .21 .20 .25 .22 .14 .11 .12 .19 .18 .24 .54 .17
quintile 4 .11 .17 .09 .21 .20 .15 .13 .10 .14 .19 .15 .22 .16
quintile 5 .13 .25 .29 .25 .19 .20 .20 .12 .21 .23 .26 .48 .16
with children .25 .08 .37 .15 .47 .09 .13 .07 .09 .19 .73 .87 .16
no children .12 .27 .27 .27 .31 .15 .14 .16 .22 .19 .26 .64 .24
Hours: participants only* .05 .03 -.01 .03 -.01 .02 .02 .01 .01 .05 -.08 .03 .00
Participation** .08 .23 .27 .27 .34 .11 .12 .17 .21 .15 .43 .62 .22
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.07) (.08) (.09) (.10)
Income elasticity
Hours .000 -.003 -.008 .075 .112 .001 -.002 -.006 -.007 .000 -.041 -.028 -.003
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.052) (.033) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.005) (.006) (.024)
Participation** .000 -.002 -.005 .077 .104 .001 .000 -.002 -.003 .000 -.037 -.021 .000
(.000) (.001) (.002) (.049) (.031) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.005) (.005) (.022)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Wage elasticity
Hours all .08 .03 .40 .57 .35 .21 .34 .20 .17 .16 .09 .20
(.03) (.04) (.10) (.06) (.07) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.06) (.06) (.01) (.01)
quintile 1 .15 -.01 .58 .83 .31 .17 .45 .32 .28 .21 n.a. .21
quintile 2 .10 .03 .50 .58 .34 .21 .57 .26 .19 .20 n.a. .27
quintile 3 .08 .01 .33 .58 .36 .22 .39 .20 .16 .21 n.a. .22
quintile 4 .06 .06 .30 .44 .35 .20 .30 .14 .14 .11 n.a. .18
quintile 5 .00 .03 .32 .46 .35 .22 .12 .08 .09 .08 n.a. .14
with children .22 .15 .54 .57 .61 1.25 .19 .28 .11 .13 .11 .18
no children .07 -.01 .37 .57 .32 .14 .35 .19 .17 .17 .08 .20
Hours: participants only* .01 -.02 .02 .09 .02 .01 .03 .03 .00 .01 .00 .02
Participation** .08 .04 .39 .47 .35 .22 .28 .18 .17 .15 .08 .18
(.02) (.04) (.10) (.06) (.07) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.05) (.06) (.01) (.01)
Income elasticity
Hours -.003 .000 -.007 -.012 -.021 -.005 .042 .023 .000 .061 .000 -.006
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.010) (.008) (.000) (.026) (.000) (.000)
Participation** -.001 .000 -.006 -.012 -.018 -.003 .044 .024 .000 .062 .000 -.005
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.009) (.007) (.000) (.026) (.000) (.000)
Note: elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
* pure intensive margin, ** pure extensive margin
42Table 12: Robustness Checks





98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01
7 2 (baseline) .34 .28 .31 .30 .13 .23 .13 .31 .31 .62 .47 .32
7 2 * .34 .29 .31 .30 .14 .23 .13 .31 .32 .61 .49 .32
7 2 ** .38 .25 .25 .25 .12 .20 .12 .32 .34 .57 .46 .34
4 2 .33 .36 .39 .33 .14 .23 .18 .29 .32 .52 .55 .36
13 2 .36 .28 .34 .29 .14 .23 .15 .31 .31 .56 .47 .31
7 3 .34 .34 .32 .32 .14 .24 .17 .27 .31 .49 .52 .31
7 4 .36 .26 .33 .32 .14 .23 .14 .29 .31 .55 .45 .31
7 2 $ .34 .29 .31 .30 .14 .22 .15 .30 .31 .54 .47 .31
7 2 (baseline) .27 .22 .23 .25 .12 .19 .10 .24 .22 .57 .42 .27
7 2 * .28 .23 .23 .25 .13 .19 .11 .23 .22 .57 .43 .27
7 2 ** .33 .21 .20 .19 .11 .16 .10 .25 .25 .54 .37 .26
4 2 .29 .28 .30 .27 .13 .21 .15 .25 .28 .49 .51 .31
13 2 .29 .22 .25 .24 .13 .19 .11 .23 .20 .53 .41 .26
7 3 .28 .27 .24 .27 .13 .20 .13 .23 .23 .49 .48 .28
7 4 .28 .21 .25 .27 .13 .21 .12 .24 .22 .55 .44 .29
7 2 $ .27 .22 .23 .25 .12 .18 .12 .23 .21 .51 .41 .26
7 2 (baseline) -.001 -.002 -.002 -.004 .001 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.006 -.004 -.008 .007
7 2 * -.001 -.002 -.002 -.004 .001 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.005 -.004 -.008 .007
7 2 ** .000 -.001 -.001 .000 .000 -.007 -.001 -.004 -.007 .001 -.008 -.009
4 2 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.004 .001 -.002 -.002 -.006 -.006 -.005 -.009 .007
13 2 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.004 .001 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.006 -.005 -.008 .007
7 3 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.004 .001 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.007 -.006 -.010 .007
7 4 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.004 .001 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.007 -.006 -.011 .008
7 2 $ -.001 -.002 -.001 -.004 .001 -.003 -.003 -.005 -.004 -.004 -.009 .007
7 2 (baseline) -.001 -.002 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.007 .007
7 2 * -.001 -.001 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.004 -.003 -.006 .007
7 2 ** .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.006 -.001 -.001 -.003 .000 -.005 -.010
4 2 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.002 -.005 -.005 -.004 -.007 .008
13 2 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.001 -.004 -.004 -.004 -.007 .007
7 3 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.001 -.003 -.004 -.004 -.008 .008
7 4 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.003 .001 -.001 .000 -.003 -.004 -.001 -.009 .008
7 2 $ -.001 -.001 -.001 -.003 .001 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.003 -.004 -.007 .007
All values are estimated elasticities obtained by averaging predicted frequencies before and after uniform marginal increases of wage rates/unearned income, excepted:
* Average elasticities over 200 draws of the estimated parameters in their distribution
** Elasticities calculated using the calibration method (pseudo-residuals drawn to obtain a perfect match and retained after shock on wage/non-labor income)
$ is the baseline specification with a different addition to improve the flexibility of the model (fixed costs of work are replaced by part-time dummies).
Models' specifications vary with the number of choices in the discretization and the functional form of the utility fonction. We report here the order of the polynomial in
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98 01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05
7 2 (baseline) .33 .32 .14 .63 .51 .12 .09 .16 .11 .08 .15 .14
7 2 * .36 .34 .14 .63 .51 .14 .11 .16 .12 .09 .15 .14
7 2 ** .35 .32 .16 .68 .43 .11 .09 .17 .12 .09 .16 .21
4 2 .37 .33 .12 .58 .57 .17 .10 .18 .07 .05 .15 .15
13 2 .33 .35 .15 .59 .47 .11 .12 .16 .11 .07 .15 .15
7 3 .41 .34 .17 .62 .56 .18 .13 .14 .09 .13 .16 .12
7 4 .47 .33 .14 .68 .62 .19 .17 .16 .12 .11 .16 .11
7 2 $ .40 .30 .14 .52 .47 .13 .10 .15 .11 .04 .15 .15
7 2 (baseline) .28 .20 .11 .53 .43 .08 .07 .11 .07 .06 .13 .12
7 2 * .32 .22 .11 .54 .43 .10 .09 .12 .07 .07 .13 .12
7 2 ** .27 .18 .11 .55 .34 .07 .08 .12 .07 .08 .15 .18
4 2 .32 .25 .11 .53 .51 .14 .09 .16 .05 .05 .13 .14
13 2 .28 .22 .12 .50 .40 .08 .09 .11 .06 .05 .13 .12
7 3 .42 .22 .15 .57 .50 .12 .10 .09 .05 .10 .13 .09
7 4 .47 .22 .12 .61 .54 .13 .12 .10 .06 .09 .13 .08
7 2 $ .35 .19 .11 .44 .40 .09 .07 .10 .06 .04 .13 .12
7 2 (baseline) .001 -.001 .000 -.001 .000 -.003 -.002 -.008 -.002 .000 .000 .000
7 2 * -.002 -.001 .000 -.001 .000 -.003 -.002 -.008 -.002 .000 .000 .000
7 2 ** -.004 -.003 .000 .000 -.002 -.003 .002 -.008 -.001 .000 .000 .080
4 2 .001 -.001 .000 .000 .001 -.003 -.002 -.008 -.002 .000 .000 .000
13 2 -.001 -.001 .000 .000 .001 -.003 -.002 -.008 -.003 .000 .000 .000
7 3 -.001 -.001 .000 -.002 .002 -.004 -.003 -.010 -.003 .000 .000 .001
7 4 -.004 -.001 .000 -.002 .002 -.002 -.002 -.008 -.003 .000 .000 .001
7 2 $ -.003 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.002 -.008 -.002 .000 .000 .000
7 2 (baseline) .001 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.001 -.004 -.001 .000 .000 .000
7 2 * -.002 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.001 -.004 -.001 .000 .000 .000
7 2 ** -.003 -.002 .000 .000 .002 -.002 .002 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .079
4 2 .001 -.001 .000 .000 .001 -.002 -.002 -.006 -.001 .000 .000 .000
13 2 -.001 -.001 .000 .000 .001 -.002 -.002 -.003 -.001 .000 .000 .000
7 3 .013 -.001 .000 -.001 .002 -.003 -.002 -.006 -.002 .000 .000 .001
7 4 .013 .000 .000 -.002 .002 -.002 -.002 -.006 -.002 .000 .000 .001
7 2 $ -.003 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.001 -.004 -.001 .000 .000 .000
All values are estimated elasticities obtained by averaging predicted frequencies before and after uniform marginal increases of wage rates/unearned income, excepted:
* Average elasticities over 200 draws of the estimated parameters in their distribution
** Elasticities calculated using the calibration method (pseudo-residuals drawn to obtain a perfect match and retained after shock on wage/non-labor income)
$ is the baseline specification with a different addition to improve the flexibility of the model (fixed costs of work are replaced by part-time dummies).
Models' specifications vary with the number of choices in the discretization and the functional form of the utility fonction. We report here the order of the polynomial in
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